I will just jump straight in with my responses.
Section 2: Legal Definitions
2.1 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the new content on Gender Recognition Certificates is clear.
The new guidance is dangerously unclear about who is protected under the Equality Act 2010. By focusing on “legal sex” as determined solely by sex recorded at birth - even for those with a Gender Recognition Certificate - it risks implying that only people actively in transition are covered under the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.
This is incorrect in law. The Equality Act explicitly protects people who have proposed to undergo, are undergoing, or have undergone any part of a gender reassignment process. There is no requirement for medical treatment, a GRC, or that the process be ongoing. To suggest otherwise risks denying protections to those who have completed transition or who do not fit a narrow, surgical definition of gender reassignment. This creates real legal and practical risks for trans people, and opens the door to discrimination that the Act was specifically designed to prevent.
Further, the framing of this guidance implicitly defines a person’s transition in relation to medical surgery or physical intervention, despite the fact that transition is a social and legal process, not a medical one. Nowhere in the Equality Act 2010 is surgery required for a person to be recognised as undergoing, or having completed, gender reassignment. In fact, the Act explicitly states that a person is protected if they are “proposing to undergo, undergoing or have undergone a process (or part of a process)” to reassign their sex - with no reference to medical treatment or surgical procedures.
By implying that legal recognition through a Gender Recognition Certificate should not change a person’s legal sex because their sex at birth is supposedly immutable - and that recognition is therefore dependent on medical intervention - the EHRC's revised explanation misrepresents the intent and spirit of the Equality Act. This conflation reinforces harmful misconceptions and risks reinforcing discriminatory barriers for trans people who are either unable or unwilling to undergo medical transition but who are nevertheless legally recognised in their acquired gender.
The structure of this question demonstrates a fundamental flaw in consultation design and lacks statistical validity. Rather than asking respondents whether they agree with the changes to the guidance on Gender Recognition Certificates (GRCs), it instead asks whether the explanation of the new guidance is "clear." These are not equivalent, and the conflation of comprehension with approval leads to significant response bias.
From a methodological standpoint, the question is Leading: It frames the issue in a way that presumes the legitimacy of the legal change, subtly encouraging respondents to assess how well it has been communicated rather than whether the change itself is correct, just, or necessary. Ambiguous: It does not define what constitutes a “clear” explanation, nor does it allow for responses that distinguish between understanding and disagreement. Statistically invalid: It fails to follow basic principles of social research, which demand neutrality, clear separation of variables, and the avoidance of questions that lead or confuse.
This question violates all of the best practices from the British Polling Council, Social Research Association and the Office of National Statistics. To ensure robust consultation outcomes, the EHRC should have presented separate questions addressing whether respondents understand the explanation of the legal change, and whether they agree or disagree with the change itself. By failing to separate these distinct dimensions, this question risks producing results that misrepresent the views of consultees, and therefore cannot be reliably used to support any future recommendations or policy changes.
2.2 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the new content on Gender Recognition Certificates is clear.
While the guidance states that asking about a person’s sex must be “proportionate and necessary,” the surrounding recommendations imply that almost any context involving single-sex spaces - such as toilets - would justify such questions. This presents a dangerous overreach. Nearly all workplaces and services provide such facilities, meaning almost all could claim justification to ask about sex assigned at birth. This would normalise highly invasive and discriminatory practices under the guise of safeguarding, and expose transgender individuals to routine scrutiny and compelled disclosure. It conflicts with both data protection laws and the Equality Act 2010’s intended protections, and risks creating an environment where trans people are not just marginalised, but systematically under surveillance.
Further, as the revised definition of legal sex and the surrounding guidance may encourage organisations to routinely request or infer an individual’s sex at birth - particularly in contexts involving toilets or other single-sex spaces, this would often constitute a breach of UK GDPR. Sex at birth, particularly where it relates to trans individuals, constitutes special category data and may not be collected without a clear and lawful basis under both Article 6 and Article 9. Most employers and service providers would not meet these conditions, and the EHRC’s failure to caution against unlawful data collection risks encouraging systemic GDPR violations. It also undermines the privacy, dignity, and legal protections of transgender people.
2.3 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the new content on defining sex at birth for individuals and legal professionals is clear.
The inclusion of new content defining “sex at birth” as the sole determinant of legal sex under the Equality Act 2010 is both misleading and legally reductive.
Firstly, it fails to reflect the original legislative intent of the Equality Act. The Act protects individuals undergoing gender reassignment (Section 7) and was framed with the understanding that those who obtained a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) would be legally recognised as their acquired sex. Redefining legal sex solely as “sex recorded at birth” undermines this principle, contradicts the legal effect of a GRC under the Gender Recognition Act 2004, and erodes established protections for trans people.
Secondly, the definition of “sex at birth” is conceptually and scientifically unstable. It is not a confirmed biological fact, but rather an observed categorisation, often made without reference to chromosomes, hormones, or other complexities of sex development. This approach ignores the existence of intersex people, dismisses medical realities, and imposes a false sense of certainty on what is in fact a socially mediated administrative label.
Thirdly, the operational consequences of defining sex in this way are dangerous. It implicitly invites organisations, employers, and service providers to demand knowledge of a person’s sex at birth in order to enforce single-sex spaces or policies. This raises serious data protection concerns under UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018, as such information constitutes special category data, and its collection or use is unlawful unless stringent conditions are met - conditions which most employers and services will not satisfy.
Finally, this approach contributes to a hostile and exclusionary environment for transgender people by invalidating the legal and social recognition of their identities, casting doubt on their rights, and opening the door to unnecessary scrutiny, surveillance, and discrimination.
2.4 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the updated description of the protected characteristic of sexual orientation is clear.
This question is methodologically flawed and ethically compromised. By asking whether the "explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities" is clear, it avoids inviting any scrutiny of the content of the explanation itself. It presupposes clarity and fails to distinguish between clarity and agreement - a fundamental error in survey design. According to established ethical guidance for consultations and statistical survey methods (such as those outlined by the Social Research Association and the Office for National Statistics), questions must avoid conflation, leading language, and ambiguity. This question fails on all three counts.
Moreover, the explanation of the protected characteristic of sexual orientation provided in the updated guidance is overly narrow, legally simplistic, and conceptually outdated. While it technically aligns with Section 12(1) of the Equality Act 2010, which defines sexual orientation as being towards the same sex, the opposite sex, or either sex, the guidance fails to interpret this language in a way that reflects the diversity of identities and relationships that fall under that protection in practice. Specifically, it excludes or delegitimises identities such as pansexual, queer, and those involving attraction to non-binary people - even though such individuals are, in reality, protected under the law.
Further, the statement that "sexual orientation relates to how people feel as well as their actions" is deeply problematic. It reduces sexual orientation to subjective feelings or observable behaviour, trivialising what for many people is a fixed, deeply rooted aspect of their identity. This language lacks legal or psychological rigour and undermines the seriousness with which sexual orientation should be treated in equality law and policy.
As a transgender woman in a long-term relationship with another woman, I find the implications of this guidance both alienating and dehumanising. By implicitly defining sexual orientation in relation to sex assigned at birth, the guidance categorises my relationship as heterosexual. That categorisation is not only incorrect - it is a profound erasure of my lived experience, and of my partner’s. She is a lesbian. That identity was not adopted lightly or superficially; it was something she spent years coming to terms with and had to courageously affirm, publicly and personally. To imply now, under a legal framework, that she is in a heterosexual relationship simply because I am trans is more than a technical error - it is a denial of her identity, her history, and the emotional labour she has invested in living truthfully.
Our relationship - a same-sex relationship - has involved the same struggles, the same societal resistance, and the same triumphs as any other lesbian couple. This guidance doesn’t just overlook that - it attempts to rewrite it. It tells me I am not a woman, and tells her she is not a lesbian. It legally misgenders me and redefines her against her will. That is not clarity. That is harm disguised as administrative simplicity.
Finally, this redefinition of sexual orientation through a gendered, birth-sex lens not only undermines the lived realities of trans and queer people, but also encourages a regressive understanding of legal identity that is inconsistent with the Equality Act’s protective purpose. It is a step backwards - legally, ethically, and socially.
Section 4: Discrimination by Perception
4.1 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the new example on sex discrimination by perception is clear.
This question is flawed both in its structure and in the substance of the example it refers to.
Firstly, from a consultation methodology perspective, the question is biased and lacks neutrality. It asks whether the "explanation" is clear, without allowing respondents to challenge whether the legal interpretation given is accurate, inclusive, or even justifiable. This is a recurring flaw throughout the consultation and is contrary to ethical guidelines for public consultation design, including those outlined by the Social Research Association and standard survey methodology principles used in policy research. It conflates clarity with agreement and fails to allow for substantive critique. The question thus risks producing distorted results and undermining the legitimacy of the consultation process.
Turning to the content of the example provided (para 4.1.3), it is legally inconsistent, conceptually confused, and socially harmful. It suggests that a trans woman - who the EHRC asserts is not legally a woman under the Equality Act - could nonetheless claim sex discrimination if she is perceived to be a woman and treated less favourably on that basis.
This interpretation undermines legal clarity in several ways:
· It reinforces the EHRC’s redefinition of “legal sex” as “sex recorded at birth,” which already contradicts the legislative intent of the Equality Act and the Gender Recognition Act 2004.
· It then attempts to soften the effect of that position by suggesting that trans women could still be protected indirectly - through perceived sex - if discrimination occurs on the assumption that they are women.
· This is legally incoherent. If the EHRC now defines trans women as legally male, then to say that they are protected as women via perception alone is not a clarification - it is an admission that the new framework has created absurd and contradictory outcomes. The protection offered is a technical workaround that depends not on a trans person's actual status or identity, but on the prejudiced perception of others. It reduces their right to protection to a side-effect of someone else’s bias.
As a trans woman, I find this profoundly offensive and alienating. According to this example, I am not legally recognised as a woman, yet I may be allowed to claim discrimination if someone else mistakenly thinks I am one - and treats me badly for it. This is not equality. This is a policy structure that systematically denies my identity while offering a convoluted loophole through which I might be allowed to protest the consequences of that denial, but only when the prejudice is obvious enough.
This approach treats trans people not as subjects of law with full personhood, but as exceptions to be handled by legal technicalities. It puts our recognition in the hands of the very people who discriminate against us. Worse still, it legitimises that discrimination by reinforcing the idea that sex - as assigned at birth - is the only basis for real protection, and that everything else is mere perception.
The impact of this is not theoretical. It tells people like me, and those around me, that the legal system does not affirm my womanhood - only others’ prejudices against it. It invalidates the profound emotional, social, and legal work that goes into transition. It forces us to rely on others’ faulty assumptions to gain even partial protection from harm.
This example does not clarify the law. It obscures it, distorts it, and - most unforgivably - it strips dignity from those of us who rely on the law to affirm our basic humanity.
4.2 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the new content on discrimination due to pregnancy and maternity is clear (This relates to Change 4.2 on removal of superseded case law.)
This question, once again, conflates clarity with correctness and legitimacy. It asks whether the explanation of legal rights is "clear," yet the real issue at stake is whether the legal framing itself is accurate, just, and coherent. The question’s wording therefore fails to meet the standards of ethical consultation design - it presumes acceptance of a specific legal framing while offering no space to dispute its implications. It also fails to acknowledge that the “clarity” it presumes comes at the cost of legal and ethical integrity.
Turning to the substance of the EHRC’s new explanation, I object strongly to the removal of the prior reference to case law that explicitly recognised pregnancy and maternity protections for trans men with GRCs - not merely because they were “still female,” but because the law had evolved to understand pregnancy as something that could be protected regardless of gender identity.
By now stating that trans men are protected under the Equality Act “because their legal sex is female,” the EHRC adopts an essentialist and regressive framework that ignores the complexity of gender, legal recognition, and reproductive rights. This approach represents a significant departure from the original intent of both the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and Equality Act 2010, which sought to create a structure where trans people, upon obtaining a GRC, would be fully recognised in their acquired gender - not only symbolically, but functionally under law.
Reducing the protection of trans men to a side-effect of their “biological sex” is not only scientifically inaccurate - it is deeply harmful. It strips meaning from the Gender Recognition Certificate, renders legal transition legally irrelevant, and reinforces the idea that trans people’s rights are always contingent - never intrinsic.
This has real-world implications. It tells trans men: even if you have legally transitioned, even if the state has recognised your identity and gender, the law will still treat you as female when it is convenient for institutional clarity. That is not clarity - that is opportunistic misclassification, and it invalidates both the legal and emotional significance of transition.
Further, this re-framing introduces legal confusion for providers and employers. It implies that trans men may only be protected under pregnancy and maternity provisions if they are treated as female, while other parts of the law may treat them as male. This fragmentation of legal status creates a patchwork of recognition where protections apply selectively - weakening trust in the law and leaving trans people more vulnerable to challenge and discrimination.
In short, the new explanation is not clear - it is selectively reductive, ideologically motivated, and legally inconsistent. It offers no stable footing for understanding how protections apply to trans men, and it does violence to the integrity of both the Gender Recognition Act and the Equality Act.
Section 5: Indirect Discrimination
5.1 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the new example on sex discrimination - same disadvantage is clear.
As with earlier questions in this consultation, this question is methodologically flawed. It asks only whether the explanation of legal rights and responsibilities is “clear,” yet offers no opportunity to challenge whether the *example itself is legally sound, practically useful, or socially just*. This question presumes clarity while failing to test for relevance, fairness, or interpretive risk. This violates fundamental standards of ethical consultation practice, such as those laid out by the Social Research Association and ONS guidelines, which caution against leading questions and conflated constructs.
Turning to the content of paragraph 5.1.3, I object strongly to the legal framing, conceptual confusion, and practical vagueness it introduces - particularly in the context of sex and gender reassignment.
The example presents a situation in which a cis woman is disadvantaged by council policy due to fears of personal safety, and then adds that a trans woman “may also” have a claim for indirect discrimination if she experiences a similar disadvantage. However, in doing so, the EHRC frames the trans woman as someone who “does not share the protected characteristic” of sex - thereby reaffirming its new position that trans women, even those with a Gender Recognition Certificate, are not women under the Equality Act 2010. This framing is not only ideologically driven - it is legally contentious and deeply exclusionary.
It recasts the trans woman’s vulnerability not as the result of systemic sex-based oppression, but as a *comparable consequence*, experienced adjacent to - but not as part of - women’s oppression. It reduces trans women’s claims to *derivative* protections, based on *same disadvantage* reasoning, rather than recognising trans women as women with direct protection from sex discrimination. This is not clarity - it is legal reclassification by stealth.
But even taken on its own terms, the example fails to offer meaningful guidance. It does not explain how a trans woman might establish that she suffers “essentially the same disadvantage.” It does not state whether the disadvantage must be objectively assessed, or whether perceived risk or lived experience is sufficient. It does not clarify whether a person would need to show that their fear is *based on being perceived as a woman*, or simply that the condition applied to them in similar effect. It leaves open critical operational questions, such as:
· Would a trans woman need to show that she is perceived as a woman by others?
· How would a tribunal weigh the disadvantage of the trans woman compared to that of the cis women group?
· Would trans women without a GRC be treated differently in this analysis from those with a GRC?
These are not academic issues - they are real-world matters with consequences for how policies are developed and legal cases are adjudicated. The lack of clarity here is not simply a matter of legal language - it reflects a failure of duty. This guidance should assist employers, public bodies, and trans individuals in understanding their rights and obligations. Instead, it creates **legal ambiguity, administrative confusion, and emotional harm**.
Speaking personally, as a trans woman, I find this guidance demoralising and alienating. The suggestion that I am not protected *as a woman*, but may be protected if I happen to suffer *in the same way* as a woman, redefines my identity as a legal approximation. It communicates to me - and to society - that I do not belong to the class of people structurally disadvantaged because of their sex. It denies the reality that I, like other women, navigate public space in fear of violence, objectification, and exclusion.
My experience is not analogous - it is direct. My fear is not coincidental - it is systemic. My womanhood is not theoretical - it is lived, affirmed, and real.
This guidance fails in clarity, substance, and human dignity. It should be withdrawn, and replaced with a framework that recognises the full and equal womanhood of trans women under the law.
Section 8: Harassment
8.1 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the updated example on harassment related to sex is clear.
This question once again follows a pattern of flawed consultation methodology. By asking only whether the explanation is “clear,” it does not allow consultees to challenge the legal framework, interpretive assumptions, or policy implications embedded in the example. This framing fails to meet the standards of neutral, ethical consultation design. According to both the Social Research Association and ONS guidelines, consultations must avoid leading questions and conflation of comprehension with endorsement. This question does neither.
Turning to the content of paragraph 8.1.6b, I object to the example both on legal and personal grounds. The example suggests that a trans woman being mocked with a sexist comment (“watch what you say in front of her, it’s her time of the month again”) may have a claim for harassment related to her perceived sex - i.e. as a woman - rather than in recognition of her actual legal status, identity, or experience as a woman.
This represents a deeply flawed and discriminatory legal framing. First, it implies that trans women do not have the protected characteristic of sex under the Equality Act - even where a Gender Recognition Certificate may be in place. Second, it reduces trans women’s protection under the law to the erroneous assumptions of others. In other words, I may be protected from sexist harassment not because I am a woman, but only because the perpetrator wrongly assumes that I am. That is not equality - it is institutional misrecognition.
This example also replicates and rewords the same example given for cis women in paragraph 8.1.3, but categorises it entirely differently in legal terms. For the cis woman, the harassment is direct and relates to her sex. For the trans woman, the harassment is indirect and relates to “perception.” This split creates a two-tier system of recognition in which trans women are legally adjacent to - but not part of - the category of women, even when subjected to identical treatment. This not only undermines the credibility of the guidance but sends a deeply harmful message: that trans women are only conditionally and externally understood as women, and never in their own right.
As a trans woman, I find this profoundly degrading. It is not theoretical - it reflects how the law will treat me, how employers and service providers will interpret my rights, and how perpetrators of abuse may rationalise their behaviour. According to this guidance, my protection does not stem from who I am, but from how others misidentify me. This denies the truth of my identity, and places my rights at the mercy of someone else’s ignorance or hostility.
This harms not just me, but my partner - a woman who has loved and stood by me in full understanding of who I am. She has come out publicly and personally as a lesbian, and we have navigated our relationship together as a same-sex couple. To see the law define me as a “perceived” woman - and to therefore recategorise us implicitly as a heterosexual pairing - is not just inaccurate. It is erasure. It reduces her identity to an administrative oversight, and mine to a legal technicality.
In summary, this example is not clear in its legal interpretation, it does not offer reliable guidance for real-world application, and it risks undermining the dignity and recognition of trans people under the law. It should be revised to ensure that all people, including trans women, are clearly and consistently protected from harassment related to sex - not just based on how others perceive them, but on the basis of who they are.
Section 12: Associations
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the new example on women-only associations is clear.
This question follows the same flawed approach as others in this consultation. It asks only whether the explanation is “clear,” rather than whether the legal reasoning is fair, accurate, or practical. This is a fundamental problem in consultation methodology. By conflating clarity with agreement and omitting space for dissent, it fails to meet basic standards of ethical consultation design, including neutrality, accessibility, and openness to criticism - as recommended by the Social Research Association and the Office for National Statistics.
Turning to the content of Example 12.1.3, I disagree both with its legal framing and with the absence of practical, humane consideration.
The example describes a women-only association lawfully rejecting a trans woman’s application for membership, based on the claim that she does not share the protected characteristic of sex. This interpretation relies on the assumption - reflected throughout this draft - that trans women are not considered women under the Equality Act, regardless of whether they have a Gender Recognition Certificate. This approach dismisses the intent of both the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which confers legal status upon gender transition, and the Equality Act 2010, which provides protections based on both sex and gender reassignment.
Beyond the legal issues, this guidance fails to consider the serious disruptive consequences that such exclusions may have in real-world settings. Many associations are built not simply on constitutional definitions but on longstanding relationships, trust, and community cohesion. Trans women - especially those who have been involved with a group for some time, whether as customers, colleagues, members, or contributors - often develop deep social ties within women’s organisations. These bonds play a vital role in emotional wellbeing, inclusion, and mutual support, particularly for those who are marginalised.
By suggesting that these relationships can be legally severed on the basis of reinterpreting “sex” as birth-assigned rather than legally or socially recognised, the EHRC’s guidance threatens the social fabric of such communities. It creates uncertainty and fear - not only for the trans individual, but for the other women within the group who may value and affirm her presence. It disrupts the continuity of care, mutual trust, and emotional safety that are critical to the mental health and stability of many women - especially those who are already vulnerable or have experienced trauma.
This is not an abstract policy shift - it could lead to real harm. Vulnerable individuals, including trans women with limited support networks, may find themselves excluded from the only safe or affirming spaces they know. The cumulative emotional toll of these exclusions is difficult to overstate. It has consequences for wellbeing, identity, and even survival. This guidance places those most at risk into even greater precarity, particularly those without the financial, legal, or social resources to defend their inclusion.
Furthermore, the guidance offers no clarity on how associations should apply this principle. It does not explain how organisations should determine whether someone is legally “a woman,” nor how this intersects with gender reassignment protections, or with duties to prevent discrimination and maintain inclusion. It also creates the risk of discriminatory gatekeeping practices, exposing trans women to intrusive questioning or forced disclosure of medical and legal history, as well as a contravention of data protection within the context of the GDPR.
As a trans woman, I find this example not only distressing, but actively harmful. It defines me not by my identity or my lived experience, but by what the guidance chooses to exclude me from. It positions me as someone whose presence in women’s organisations is provisional, vulnerable to reinterpretation, and subject to erasure - regardless of my legal recognition, social integration, or contributions to the community. My partner, who is a lesbian, is also affected. We participate in communities where female-only associations are common and vital to connection and support. The prospect of my exclusion creates fear and instability for both of us.
This example does not provide clarity. It undermines legal protections, destabilises social bonds, and risks serious harm to individuals and communities. It must be reconsidered in light of its legal ambiguity, operational impracticality, and its real-world impact on vulnerable people who depend on inclusion for their wellbeing.
Section 13: Separate and Single-Sex Services and Sports
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the updated section on competitive sport is clear.
This question is again flawed in its design. It only asks whether the legal explanation is “clear,” without allowing respondents to challenge whether the interpretation is correct, fair, or justifiable. This framing obscures the real concerns that many individuals and organisations may have and risks generating results that falsely suggest consensus. Such a structure does not meet accepted consultation standards outlined by the Social Research Association and ONS guidelines, which emphasise neutrality, transparency, and separation of understanding from endorsement.
The updated section on competitive sport introduces a framework that reinforces the idea that trans people - particularly trans women and trans men - may be excluded from participation on the basis of safety or fairness in so-called “gender-affected activities.” While this is rooted in Section 195 of the Equality Act, the guidance interprets this in a way that lacks nuance, lacks fairness, and risks entrenching exclusion rather than enabling inclusion through thoughtful policy.
Although I am not currently involved in competitive sport, this guidance sends a message to people like me - a trans woman - that I may be categorically excluded in the future from participation in physical activities with my peers. It implies that my body, regardless of any legal recognition or medical transition, is inherently unfit for fair inclusion. That has a chilling effect - not just legally, but emotionally and socially. It alienates and discourages people who may wish to become more active or engaged in the future, and it raises barriers to participation that are based on assumption rather than evidence.
The section lacks clarity in real-world application. It gives little practical guidance to small clubs or schools on how to make fair, evidence-based decisions that include trans people. It does not clarify how “necessity” is to be assessed, nor how the impact on excluded individuals is to be weighed against potential advantage. It offers no account of how non-elite or recreational sport - where inclusion and participation are often far more important than marginal differences in physical capacity - should be handled fairly.
It also fails to acknowledge that many sporting organisations are already moving away from rigid sex-segregation, particularly in non-contact and skill-based sports. In these cases, gender and sex offer no inherent advantage, and differences in performance are far more affected by training, access, coaching, and opportunity than by biology alone. Even in strength- and endurance-based sports, the assertion that all trans people represent a threat to fairness or safety is overly simplistic and potentially discriminatory.
There is also a broader historical and anthropological problem with this framing. The marked performance differences observed today between male and female elite athletes are a relatively modern phenomenon. Research shows that prior to industrialisation, biological sex was less determinative of physical capability than it is today, and modern disparities are largely shaped by social and environmental factors, including nutrition, gender-based roles, and access to physical training from an early age.
A 2021 study in American Anthropologist (Carrier et al.) notes that prehistoric hunter-gatherer societies likely relied on more shared labour roles, including endurance-based hunting, in which women likely played a key part. Similarly, anthropologist Katherine Dettwyler and others have shown that pre-modern communities had more egalitarian models of physical contribution, where capacity was tied less to sex than to role, age, and experience. These findings suggest that biological determinism in sport is more culturally constructed than inherent, particularly at non-elite levels.
Moreover, a systematic review published in Sports Medicine (2020, Hilton & Lundberg) highlights that performance gaps between sexes at sub-elite and recreational levels are much smaller than often assumed, and that testosterone suppression in trans women does significantly reduce any prior advantage - especially in endurance sports.
This updated guidance does not reflect this nuance. Instead, it reinforces broad-brush exclusions that risk being applied with little evidence or sensitivity to context. It prioritises hypothetical disadvantages over the actual exclusion of trans people from meaningful participation in society.
Sport should be about fairness - but fairness must be understood holistically. It is not fair to exclude someone entirely because of statistical assumptions that may not apply in their individual case. It is not fair to treat identity as irrelevant when the law has already recognised that identity in other domains. And it is not fair to equate social belonging and inclusion with risk unless that risk is clearly and demonstrably present.
In summary, this section lacks clarity, consistency, and compassion. It overreaches legally, generalises unfairly, and misses the opportunity to encourage evidence-based inclusion in a rapidly evolving sporting landscape. It should be revised with a focus on individual assessment, scientific integrity, and the fundamental principle that equality law should protect - not marginalise - those seeking only to participate.
13.2 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the updated section on separate and single-sex services for men and women is clear.
The question is once again poorly constructed from a survey ethics perspective. By only asking whether the legal explanation is “clear,” it deflects scrutiny away from the deeper issue of whether the guidance is fair, accurate, or justifiable. It prevents the consultee from disagreeing with the interpretation or implications, and thus fails to comply with ethical standards of public consultation that demand neutrality, non-leading language, and respect for diverse stakeholder positions.
Legally, this section appears to be a straightforward interpretation of Schedule 3 of the Equality Act 2010 regarding separate or single-sex services. However, in practice, the application of these rules is anything but clear - particularly in the context of trans inclusion. While the wording gives the appearance of clarity, it fails to adequately address the challenges that service providers will face in interpreting “proportionate means,” “legitimate aim,” or the highly subjective idea of what one “might reasonably object” to.
More crucially, this section makes no mention of the real-world impact these provisions have on trans people. It fails to discuss how such segregation can - and already does - lead to trans individuals being excluded from essential services, often at moments of extreme vulnerability, such as in healthcare, shelters, or during public crises. For many of us, this isn’t a hypothetical scenario - it’s a very real fear that access will be denied, challenged, or questioned based on someone else's assumptions or discomfort.
Framing single-sex services around the comfort or objection of others - even when that discomfort may be rooted in bias or misinformation - creates a tiered access system where trans people’s rights are constantly in question. That is not equality. That is conditional participation, and it causes harm.
Worse still, this guidance inadvertently normalises the systemic segregation of spaces under the guise of safety or dignity - a logic which has historically been used not just against trans people, but against women, ethnic minorities, and other marginalised groups. Once you legitimise exclusion based on vague notions of comfort or assumptions about risk, you open the door to widespread abuse and uneven application.
From a feminist perspective, this approach is especially troubling. It infantilises women by reinforcing a worldview in which women are positioned primarily as vulnerable, in need of protection, and perpetually at risk. Rather than empowering women, it casts them as passive recipients of safety - reinforcing the very patriarchal norms that feminists have fought to dismantle. It uses the spectre of threat - often imagined, rarely evidenced - to justify an expansive rollback of trans inclusion and bodily autonomy for all.
Segregating services in this way can also have profound consequences for community cohesion. People do not live in isolation - relationships are built across gender identities, including in support groups, religious communities, volunteer services, and educational spaces. By imposing strict and ambiguous rules about who can access what space, the guidance risks tearing apart networks of care and trust that have been built over years. For the most vulnerable - those who rely on consistent access to services, or who face abuse or isolation at home - this disruption could have serious mental health and safety consequences.
In summary, while the text may appear “clear” on its surface, it is deeply unclear in how it would be applied fairly in practice. More importantly, it is ethically unsound, legally fraught, socially harmful, and personally distressing. It creates a framework that enables discrimination through poorly defined exceptions, and ultimately advances a view of society that marginalises trans people while simultaneously disempowering women. That cannot be what equality legislation is meant to achieve.
13.3 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the new section on justification for separate and single-sex services is clear.
While this section is extensive, it is far from clear. The language and structure are ambiguous, internally contradictory, and introduce serious confusion around the rights of trans people, particularly in relation to separate and single-sex services.
The statement in paragraph 13.3.19-that if a service includes trans women in a women’s space, it is no longer legally single-sex-undermines established understandings of gender reassignment protections under the Equality Act 2010. This interpretation is legally questionable and appears to pre-emptively exclude trans people based purely on biological essentialism, rather than any evidence of risk or harm. This has the effect of encouraging service providers to exclude trans people, even when doing so is unnecessary and disproportionate.
The section frequently refers to “proportionality” as a legal standard but provides no measurable criteria for assessing what is or isn’t proportionate. This creates a situation in which decisions are made based on prejudice or assumed discomfort rather than evidence, fairness, or actual need.
As a trans woman, I find this section extremely distressing. It treats my inclusion as something that undermines the legal status of a service, and frames me as a disadvantage to be weighed against the needs of others. It invites exclusion not based on behaviour or need, but on assumptions about my body. It also disregards the real-world impact of losing access to supportive services and spaces where trusted relationships have already been built over time-relationships that are essential for safety, wellbeing, and community integration.
Additionally, this section reinforces outdated, patriarchal ideas that portray women as inherently in need of protection from others, including trans women, rather than capable of sharing space safely and respectfully. This does harm to feminist aims as well as to the dignity of trans individuals.
Overall, this guidance is not clear. It is vague, discriminatory, and risks legitimising harmful practices under the guise of legality.
13.4 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the new content on policies and exceptions for separate and single-sex services is clear.
Again, the question invites superficial agreement rather than substantive critique. It ignores whether the policy exceptions themselves are ethically or legally sound.
The guidance outlines multiple exceptions (age, sex, safety, dignity) but fails to provide criteria or thresholds. It’s unclear how to balance conflicting rights-e.g., a trans woman’s right to privacy vs. cis women’s comfort.
Without criteria, organisations may default to exclusion to avoid risk, particularly affecting small providers lacking legal resources.
Framing women as needing protection implies fragility and ignores women’s agency. It reinforces outdated stereotypes and discourages solidarity across gender lines.
13.5 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the updated section on separate or single-sex services in relation to gender reassignment is clear.
The explanation in this section is not clear and is fundamentally flawed both in substance and effect. While it presents itself as a neutral legal clarification, it in fact introduces harmful ambiguities that risk institutionalising discrimination against transgender people-particularly transgender women-under the guise of legitimate exception.
Legally, the language does not adequately reconcile the protections provided under the Gender Recognition Act 2004, where an individual with a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) must be treated as their acquired gender for all legal purposes, with the exceptions outlined in this section. Instead, it risks placing service providers in legally contradictory positions: either upholding someone’s legal sex as affirmed by a GRC, or overriding it based on a vaguely defined concept of “proportionality” and “legitimacy.” This invites inconsistency, personal bias, and unlawful gatekeeping-particularly in settings where there is no judicial or formal oversight.
From a practical perspective, it provides no clear guidance on how service providers should determine who qualifies for inclusion or exclusion. It relies instead on assumptions about risk, safety, or privacy-terms that are often weaponised against trans people despite a lack of evidence supporting the claim that trans inclusion poses any credible threat. This lack of clarity creates a chilling effect: many service providers may choose to exclude trans women simply to avoid controversy or legal risk, regardless of our actual legal status.
The emotional and social consequences of this are profound. As a transgender woman in a same-sex relationship, this guidance communicates that I am not a full woman in the eyes of the law, even when I have fulfilled the requirements the state sets out for recognition. It invalidates not only my legal status, but the legitimacy of my relationship and social life. It forces people like me to live under the constant threat of exclusion-never knowing whether the next gym, support group, or health service will turn me away, misgender me, or treat me as a risk.
Finally, the framing of the consultation question itself is problematic. It asks whether the explanation is clear, not whether the guidance is fair, accurate, or compliant with human rights law. This avoids necessary scrutiny and subtly pressures respondents to affirm a flawed framework simply because the wording is superficially legible.
13.6 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The explanation of the legal rights and responsibilities set out in the updated content on communal accommodation is clear.
The explanation presented in this section regarding communal accommodation is not clear, and more critically, it risks enabling discriminatory practices that are both harmful and poorly grounded in evidence or law.
From a legal and policy standpoint, the section fails to adequately explain how decisions about access to communal accommodation for transgender individuals - especially trans women - should be made in compliance with both the Equality Act 2010 and human rights obligations. While it references "proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim," it does not define what constitutes such aims, nor does it provide clear guidance to prevent arbitrary or prejudicial exclusions. In doing so, it delegates potentially life-altering decisions to service providers without a coherent legal framework, leaving significant room for inconsistency, misapplication, and ultimately, abuse.
From a survey ethics perspective, the question again frames the issue in a way that avoids addressing the legitimacy or justice of the policy itself. It instead asks whether the explanation is "clear", a subtle but manipulative move that steers respondents away from engaging with the potential harm embedded in the policy content. This kind of question design undermines the integrity of the consultation.
From a personal and emotional perspective, the impact of such policies is profound. As a transgender woman, the fear of being refused communal accommodation, for example in a domestic violence refuge, a hostel, or shared care setting, is not an abstract legal concern. It is a real, daily anxiety that affects my ability to feel safe, supported, and included in society. For many transgender people, communal spaces are often accessed at moments of acute vulnerability: homelessness, fleeing abuse, recovering from illness. To be excluded at that point is not merely a policy failure, it is a direct threat to our well-being and survival.
Furthermore, the guidance does not account for the social relationships and trust that often develop in communal environments. Arbitrarily removing or excluding trans individuals from these settings can cause immense psychological harm - not only to us, but to the people we live with, who may already accept and support us. The notion that safety and comfort can only be achieved by excluding trans people reinforces a deeply patriarchal view of women as inherently vulnerable and in need of protection from people like me. It does not reflect reality and only serves to entrench fear and division.
In summary, the updated guidance on communal accommodation is neither clear nor just. It fails on legal, ethical, and human grounds - and must be revisited to provide a framework that protects all service users, including transgender people, with consistency, dignity, and respect.
Section 14: Final Question
14.1 Do you have any other feedback about the content of the Code of Practice that you have not already mentioned?
I wish to register my strongest possible objection to the proposed changes to the Code of Practice. As a transgender woman directly affected by these proposals, I find them not only deeply discriminatory but profoundly unethical in both substance and process.
This consultation is framed in a way that obscures its regressive objectives. It uses misleadingly neutral language to rationalise the exclusion of trans people from services, spaces, and protections we currently have under law. It does this by relying on an extreme and legally contested interpretation of the Equality Act 2010 - one that disregards well-established case law and international human rights standards.
The Supreme Court ruling referenced throughout does not, and cannot, override the Equality Act’s protections for those with the characteristic of gender reassignment. Nor does it justify the disproportionate erosion of trans people’s rights in public life. What is being proposed here is not clarification, it is exclusion, by design. The repeated emphasis on "biological sex" as a gatekeeping mechanism, and the claim that including trans women makes a service no longer "single-sex," amounts to state-sanctioned discrimination and an open invitation to remove trans people from public life.
From a human rights perspective, this entire exercise is dangerous. It undermines the UK’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly Articles 8 and 14. It seeks to normalise prejudice under the guise of “clarity” and “balance.” These changes risk not only breaching the rights of transgender people, but also entrenching harmful social norms that isolate, dehumanise, and endanger us.
This process has also been unethical from a consultation standpoint. The questions are often loaded or misleading. They do not allow for adequate disagreement with the fundamental premise of the proposed changes. They fail to meet the ethical standards expected of public consultations, including neutrality, transparency, and protection of vulnerable stakeholders.
This is not merely a policy debate - it is a personal attack. I am a human being. I am a woman. I deserve dignity, safety, and equality, not to be weighed as a threat in a balance of rights where my exclusion is treated as default, and my inclusion is seen as exceptional or problematic.
I am sending a copy of my responses to a number of organisations and entities, of which includes my Member of Parliament, to TransActual UK, to The Green Party (of which I am a member), to Amnesty International, to the Good Law Project, and to the European Court of Human Rights. I also intend to submit a formal complaint about the conduct and ethics of this consultation process to the appropriate regulatory bodies. Finally, I will be publishing my full response on my personal website as a record of my objection and in solidarity with others affected.
This Code of Practice, if implemented as drafted, would mark one of the most regressive steps backward for minority rights in the UK in recent memory. I oppose it entirely.